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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
sons were acting have arisen in connec-
tion with the question of defacto officers.
While the principal case has met with
much unfavorable criticism, it would
seem that some of it at least arises from
the employment of the term "de facto"
in the sense there used, rather than from
any well-grounded belief that the deci-
sion is not in accordance with principle.
The term "de facto" is recognised as
having a certain meaning and use in con-
nection with persons holding and exer-
cising the functions of an office without
having a strict legal right thereto ; but
its use as applied to political organiza-
tions is not frequent, and indeed, by some
very eminent law writers, its right to be
so used seems to be denied.
In Williams v. Bruffy, 6 Otto 176, the
Supreme Court of the United States
speaks of de facto governments, and in-
stances the circumstances under which
they may be said to exist, and when their
acts will be recognised as the actsofa de
facto power. Such a status, however,
Was not conceded to the confederate
states, although the legislative acts of the
several states in rebellion were held to be
of binding force where they did not im-
pair or tend to impair the supremacy of
the national authority, or the just rights
of citizens under the constitution.
If, as stated in this case, there may
exist de facto governments, there would
seem to be no good reason wily the term
may not be applied to a court, under
circumstances as shown in the principal
case.
The objection that a de facto officer
presupposes a dejure office, seems at first
thought to have much force in the dis-
cussion of this question, but considered in
the light or the two cardinal doctrines of
the dejacto law-possession under color
of right; and the public necessity of
holding valid the acts of those who have
been reputed and acknowledged by the
public as having rightful authority-it
would seem to be a long distance from
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SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.
1
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF IMASSACHUSETTS. 3
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.'
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.6
ACTION. See Surety.
Promise to pay Debt of Promisee to ThIrd Person.-A promise by A.
to B., who has assigned certain goods to A., to pay the amount owed by
I From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 32 Kansas Reports.
2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 61 Md. Rep.
3 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 136 Mass. Rep.
4 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 38 N. J. Eq. Rep.
5 From Edwin T. Ialmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 56 Vt. Rep.
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B. to his employees for labor on the goods, will not render A. liable to
an action of contract by one of such employees : Morrill v. Lane, 136
Mass.
Injury to Chattel in Baiee's Possession-Suit by Bailee.-If a chat-
tel, while in the possession of a bailee for hire, is injured by the negli-
gence of a third person, and is repaired by the bailor, and the cost of
the repairs is charged to the bailee, at his request, the latter, although
he has not paid such cost, may riaintain an action of tort against the
person causing the damage : Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass.
AssuMPSIT. See Action.
Overpayment-Mistake-Practice.-In an action of general assumpsit
to recover money overpaid on settlement, it was proved that the defend-
ant had money in his hands that in good conscience belonged to the
plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, although the
special ground upon which he claimed to establish the overpayment
failed : .Bates v. Quinn, 56 Vt.
BAILMENT. See Action.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Draft authorized by Telegram-Authority revoked by Telegram-
Liability of Drawee as Acceptor.-Where a telegram is sent authorizing
a draft to be drawn, and another telegram is afterward sent counter-
manding the authority previously given, and on the faith of the first
telegram, which only was exhibited to the cashier of the bank, a draft
was discounted by the bank, the drawee cannot be held liable as
acceptor: First Nat. Bank of Flora v. Clark, 61 Md.
The drawee of a draft will not be held liable for a breach of promise
in not accepting, unless there was a promise to accept it at the time the
draft was drawn : Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Loss of Baggage-Articles not properly falling within that Descrip-
tion.-Where the duly authorized agent of a railroad company receives-
personal property to be transported as baggage, the railroad company
must account for.such property as baggage, although in strict language
it might not be baggage: Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Conklin, 32 Kans.
Where personal property is received by a railroad company to be
transported as baggage, and while it is in the possession of the railroad
company, to be transported, it is lost or stolen; Held, that the railroad
company is responsible to the owner for its loss : id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
.Eminent Domain-Use of Highway by Telegraph Company.-The
transmission of intelligence by electricity is a business of a public char-
acter, and the legislature may grant to a telegraph company the exercise
of the right of eminent domain : Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass.
An additional servitude is not imposed by the appropriation of a
public highway, under the Pub. Sts. c. 109, for the use of a line of
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
electric telegraph, by the erection of poles and wires above the surface
of the ground; and the statute is constitutional, although it makes no
provision for compensation to the owner of the fee in the highway:
Id.
Arrest- Complaint verified on Hearsay and Belief.-It is declared by
sect. 15 of the bill of rights in the constitution of the qtate of Kansas
that no warrant shall be issued to seize any person, but on probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation; therefore a complaint or infor-
mation filed in the District Court charging a defendant with a misde-
meanor and verified on nothing but hearsay and belief is not sufficient
to authorize the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the party therein
charged, when no previous preliminary examination and no waiver of
the right to such examination has been had: State v. Gleason, 32
Kans.
Impairing Contract- County Office not a ontrat.-A county office
is not a contract and the incumbent is not protected in it by the prohi-
bition of the federal constitution against the impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts. He has no such vested interest in the salary as will
prevent the legislature from diminishing it during his term of office:
Harvey v. The Board of County Commissioners, 82 Kans.
Where a law is enacted diminishing the salary of a county officer
during his official term and such diminution applies after the law takes
effect, the law is prospective and not retroactive: Id.
Impairing Conract-Law changing pace of Payment of Negotiable
Paper.-Any law that attempts arbitrarily to change the place of pay-
ment of negotiable paper, after its sale and transfer, cannot be upheld,
as the place of payment is a part of the contract, and a law which changes
the terms of a contract impairs the same: Dillingham v. Rook, 32
Kans.
Where the bonds of a county of the state of Kansas are payable upon
their face at a particular bank in the city of New York, and such bonds
were executed and delivered prior to the passage of the act entitled,
"An act to provide for the establishment of a fiscal agency for the state
of Kansas in the city of New. York, and prescribing the duties of officers
in relation thereto," approved March 6th 1874, said act cannot change
the place of payment of the bonds of the county; and its provisions
requiring the treasurer of the county by which the bonds were executed,
to remit to the fiscal agency of the state-being a different place than
where the bonds are payable-sufficient moneys for the payment of the
bonds at the agency, is unconstitutional and void : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law.
Ifental Unsoundness-Burden of Proof.-Where a person at the
time of the comission of an alleged crime has sufficient mental capacity
to understand the nature and quality of the particular act or acts consti-
tuting the crime, and the mental capacity to know whether they are
right or wrong, he is generally responsible if he commits such act or
acts, whatever may be his capacity in other particulars. But if he does
not possess this degree of capacity, then he is not so responsible: State
v. Nixon, 32 Kans.
V o. XXXII.-69
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In a criminal prosecution, where the jury entertain a reasonable doubt
as to whether the defendant is sane or insane with respect to the par-
ticular acts charged against him, they should acquit; and held, that the
court below charged the jury in substance to this effect: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Voluntary Conveyance by Party Indebted at the time-Presumption
of Fraud-Burden of Proof-.findrance- to Creditors.-The motive or
purpose with which a voluntary transfer of property is made, by a party
indebted at the time, is not material. Such a conveyance, irrespective
of the actual intent of the debtor, is prima facie in fraud of creditors:
Goodman v. Wineland, 61 Ald.
The presumption of fraud may be repelled by proving, that the grantor,
at the time of the gift, was possessed of other means, amply sufficient
to pay his debts; and the onus of so proving is upon those seeking to
uphold the gift: Id.
It is a hindrance to creditors for a debtor to dispose of his real pro-
perty and tangible chattels, which are readily subjected to execution,
and compel them to rely upon merely personal obligations, with the
risks and the necessity for numerous attachments usually incident to such
a resource : Id.
DEED.
Execution in Blank-Innocent Purchaser.-Where C. in good faith
purchases land from S. and afterward S. delivers to C. a deed of, con-
veyance for the land completely executed by V., who is in fact the
owner of the land, and C. in good faith accepts the deed, having no
notice that the deed had been originally executed to a blank grantee,
and having no notice of any agreement between S. and V. which might
limit the effect of the deed, and S. is not the agent of either C. or V.,
but acts for himself, and no question is at any time raised with regard
to the validity of the deed as a conveyance of the land; and V. delivers
the possession of the land to C. without questioning C.'s title thereto
or anything thereon, but afterward V. claims that he is entitled to the
crops growing on the land by virtue of a parol agreement with S., -Held,
That the deed will not only convey to 0. the land, but it will also con-
vey to him all the crops growing thereon, although it may be that V.
when he executed the deed believed that he was executing the same to
S., and although in fact lie executed the deed to a blank grantee, and
that S. afterward filled up the blank by inserting the name of C., and
although there may have been a parol agreement between V. and S.
that the crops growing on the land should continue to be the property
of V.: Chapman v. Veach, 32 Kas.
EASEMENT.
Substitution of Sewer for Natural Stream- Obstruction of Sewer.-
Defendants, thirty years ago, changed the course of a natural stream of
water that ran through defendants' land and drained complainants' lands,
and substituted therefor a sewer, presumably by consent of the owner
of complainants' lands. They have obstructed the sewer and recently
built an embankment near the complainants' line so as to back the water
on complainants' said lands. Held, That this court would compel them
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to remove the embaukuient, and either restore the natural stream to its
original course or to remove the obstructions from the sewer and rebuild
it, although there is an allegation that if either be done the water will
be discharged on the lands of other persons, and also that the defend-
ants are pecuniarily unable to do either: Oliver v. N. Y Bay Cemetery
Co., 38 N. J. Eq.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Bill of Exceptions not conclusive as Evidence on a Retrial-Admissions
by Counsel-Estopel---Practic.-When a cause has been remanded
from the Supreme Court for a new trial the bill of exceptions is not con-
clusive as a statement of facts on a retrial ; nor is a party estopped by oral
admissions made by his counsel during the former trial, the admissions
having been embodied into the exceptions; but he may show what limi-
tations were made to the concessions, what transpired, out of which the
exceptions arose; thus, in an action upon a. policy of insurance, which
covered the plaintiff's furniture, the exceptions showed that the plain-
tiff conceded certain facts on the former trial from which it was evident
that he had given false answers in the application, as to the occupancy
of the lower story of the building in which his furniture was kept, and
as to the ownership of a store of goods in the same building, and on a
retrial the plaintiff offered to prove that the answers, though false, were
made without his knowledge by the defendant's own agent, "written in
afterwards," * * * the " agent using his own terms," and that the
admissions were oral, made by his attorneys on the former trial, and for
that trial only. The court, treating the exceptions as a part of the
record, ordered a verdict for the defendant. Held, error ; and that the
plaintiff's evidence should have been submitted to the jury: Mullin v.
Vt. Mutual .ire Ins. Co., 56 Vt.
EVIDENCE.
Incompetent Witness-Failure to Object to Testimony-Power of
Court.-If a party against whom an incompetent witness is called, with
full knowledge of his incompetency, allows the witness to be sworn and
examined, without objection, he will be considered to have waived the
objection to his competency: Monfort v. Rowland, 38 N. J. Eq.
Though the party against whom an incompetent witness has given evi-
dence may have lost his right to object to his evidence, yet the court
may, on its own motion, if it appears that the evidence is opposed to
the policy of the law and dangerous to the administration of justice,
suppress it; Id.
EXECUTORS.
Devise in Trust-Power to SelL-Where property is given to executors
in trust, to be equally divided among testator's children, with a direc-
tion to pay the sons their shares, and to hold the daughters' shares, and
pay them the income thereof, in half-yearly payments for life, the
executors have power to sell the testator's lands : Belcher v. Belcher, 38
N. J. Eq.
FRAUD.
Order on Employer to pay Wages-Subsequent Collection-Tort.-
The defendant, a quarryman, gave an order on 0. & Co., his employers,
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to pay his monthly wages to the plaintiff, for his, defendant's monthly
store bill, and to pay an old debt due the plaintiff. Notice was given to
0. & Co. of the order. They refused to accept it, but did, however,
pay the wages to the plaintiff for several months, then notified him that
they would do so no longer, and paid directly to the defendant. 0. &
Co. alone were responsible for the discontinuance of the payments to
the plaintiff. Held, that the receiving of his wages by the defendant,
although he was then indebted to the plaintiff, did not amount to a tort:
and that an action brought upon the theory that the defendant was lia-
ble as for a tort could not be maintained, as the element of fraud was
lacking: .lXcGuirev. Kiveland, 56 Vt.
Troy v. Aiken, 46 Vt. 55, distinguished : Id.
HIGHWAY. See .funic~pal Corporation.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Personal Injuries to Wife-Joinder of Counts for Injuries and Ex-
penses of Cure.-Action was brought on the 8th of April, 1882, by A.
W. TA. and M. his wife, against a railroad company, to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by the wife. The declaration contained
but one count, in which, after detailing the injuries sustained by the
wife, it was alleged, "and also thereby the said plaintiffs were forced
and obliged to, and did pay, lay out and expend a large sum of money
in and about endeavoring to cure the said M. of the bruises," &c.,
"occasioned as aforesaid." After verdict for the plaintiffs, a motion in
arrest of judgment was made on the ground that the declaration in-
cluded a cause of action for which the husband should sue alone. The
motion was overruled. On appeal it was Held, That it was error to
include in the claim of damages money expended to effect the wife's
cure, the right of action for money thus expended, being in the hus-
band alone: The Northern Central Railway Co. v. Mills, 61 Md.
Xarried Woman- Capacity to Execute Power-Joinder, of Husband.
-A married woman may execute any kind of power, whether simply
collateral, appendant, or in gross ; and it is immaterial whether it was
given to her while sole or married. In neither case is the concurrence
of her husband necessary: Armstrong v. Kerns, 61 Nd.
INSURANCE.
Condition against Sale-Sale by one Partner to the other.-A. sale
by one partner to his copartner, and a mortgage back. of the seller's
share of the partnership property, upon which there is a policy of in-
surance against loss by fire, issued to the partnership, are not a breach
of a condition in the policy that it shall be void, if, without the written
assent of the insurer, "the said property shall be sold." Powers v.
Guardian Fire and Life Insurance Co., 136 Mass.
A policy of insurance against loss by fire, issued to a partnership upon
its property, contained the condition that the policy should be void, if,
without the writtefi assent of the insurer, "the situation or circumstances
affecting the risk shall, by or with the advice, agency or consent of the
insured, be so altered as to cause an increase of such risk." One part-
ner sold to his copartner, and took back a mortgage of the seller's share
of the partnership property. Held, in an action on the policy, in which
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both partners joined, that it could not be said, as matter of law, after a
finding for the plaintiffs, that there was a breach of the condition : Id.
Mlfu tual Company-By-Laws providing for Reinstatement after De-
fault-Refusal to Reinstate.-The by-laws of an unincorporated mutual
insurance association provided that in case a member had, for failure to
pay an assessment promptly, been dropped from the association by the
secretary the board of directors should have power to reinstate him on
his presenting to them a reasonable excuse for such failure and paying
the sum in arrear. A member being delinquent appeared before them
and offered a sufficient reason for his delinquency, and the board refused
to reinstate him, because they alleged that his health was then precari-
ous. He died very soon afterwards. Held, that this court might, after
his death, examine into and determine the adequacy of the reason so
offered, and, in a proper case, compel the association to pay the amount
of insurance to which such delinquent's widow was entitled: Van Hou-
ten v. Pine, 38 N. J. Eq.
JUDICIAL SALE.
Rights of Purchaser-Impeachment of Decree.-A purchaser at a-
judicial sale runs no risk in respect to the correctness of the legal prin-
ciples on which the judgment under which he purchases is founded:
Shultz v. Sanders, 38 N. J. Eq.
A reversal of the judgment under which a sale has been made, subse-
quent to the passage of title, will not nullify or disturb the purchaser's
title: Id.
A purchaser at a judicial sale cannot be heard, on an application to
be discharged from his contract, to impeach the decree under which he
purchased: Id.
LEGACY.
Thterest.-Where a legacy is given to one not a child of the testator,
nor one to whom testator stood in loco parentis, payable "1 at the age of
twenty-one years," the legatee is not entitled to interest thereon except
from the time when the legacy is payable: Weatherly v. Kier, 38 N. J.
Eq.
LTBEL.
Privileged Communication.-If a person, who has been accused by
his employer of stealing money from him, informs a friend of the accu-
sation and seeks his advice, and the latter has an interview with the
employer, in which he informs him of the grounds of the charge, and
during which the accused person comes in and begins a conversation
with his employer, referring to the charge of larceny, whereupon the
employer repeats the accusation, the third person still being present, the
occasion renders the words privileged; Billings v. Fairbanks, 136
Mass.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Acknowledgment of Debt-Conditional Promise.-A debtor while in
bankruptcy wrote to his creditor as follows: "I shall pay you all I owe
you with interest, but at this time I cannot. As soon as I can, I shall
pay you. When I can, I shall pay up all my debts, and yours shall be
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the second that I pay. To pay you now, I cannot spare a dollar from
my business, but if you will wait, I think I can pay you some time."
Held, that these statements amounted only to a conditional promise to
pay when the debtor should be able; and, in the absence of evidence of
his ability to pay, would not, under the Pub. Sts. c. 78, § 3, deprive the
debtor of relying upon a discharge in bankruptcy, in bar of the recovery
of a judgment upon the debt: Elwell v. Cumner, 136 Mass.
A debtor while in bankruptcy wrote to his creditor as follows: "My
lawyer says I must not pay any one a dollar until I get through bank-
ruptcy, then I can pay if I want to do so. I shall pay you all and the
interest, but you will have to give me time. This is all I can say now."
Held, that this was not such evidence of a new or continuing contract,
within the Pub. Sts. c. 78, § 3, as would deprive the debtor of relying
upon a discharge in bankruptcy, in bar of the recovery of a judgment
upon the debt: Id.
When it commences to Run.-The defendant without leave took the
plaintiff's iron; in the following year he promised to pay for it. Held,
that the Statute of Limitations commenced to run at the time of the
promise: Farnham v. Thomas, 56 Vt.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Injury by Defective achinery-Knowledge of Defcct.-The fact that
a brakeman in the employ of a railroad corporation knew, or might have
ascertained, that the draw-bars of a locomotive engine and of a c ar, to
which it was to be coupled by him while standing upon a plank in front of
the engine, were of unequal height, so that they would be likely to pass
each other instead of coupling together, though furnishing strong evi-
dence of carelessness on his part, will not, as matter of law, preclude
him from maintaining an action against the corporation for injuries
occasioned by reason of the draw-bar so passing each other, that of the
engine being too low for the purpose for which it was used: Lawless v.
Conn. River R. R. Co., 136 Mass.
MTUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Practice; Taxation.
Negligence-Bighway by Adoption- What Evidence Necessary-
Admissions of Selectmen.-The use of a road for public travel, however
extensive that use may be, is not sufficient to constitute such road a
highway by adoption so as to impose the duty upon the town to keep it
in repair. There must be in addition evidence of some act of the town
recognising it as a highway-as putting the same in the rate bills of the
highway surveyor, expending money, thereon, shutting up the old road,
leaving no other avenue for travel, etc. hence, the plaintiff failed to
prove that the highway upon which the accident happened was one that
the town was legally bound to keep in repair, by proving that the road
was used, that it was the direct thoroughfare from one street to another,
that there were side-walks upon both sides of it, and a lamp post on one
corner ; and, although-the defendant did not object to the admission of
this evidence, it did not thereby waive its right to claim legal proof that
it was bound to keep the highway in repair:. Tower v. The Town of
Rutland, 56 Vt.
The plaintiff claimed that her horse became frightened at a dump-
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him and which in the absence of any stipulation forbidding it., B. could
sell or mortgage. Held,.further, that on the last payment the title to
the personalty vested in B., whose mortgage became valid, and took pre-
cedence of A.'s attachment: Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I.
Wdlliams v. Br qgs, 11 R. I., 476, and Cook v. Corthell, 1I. 482,
explained and distinguished : Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Rescission- When Creditor Estopped-Offer to Restore.-Where a
creditor participates in the distribution of the proceeds of property sold
under execution, he ratifies the same and is estopped from subsequently
attacking it: Adams v. Moulton, 1 MeGloin.
Such a participation, however, if made in error of fact, might, upon
proper allegations, be rescinded : Id.
Such rescission could only be decreed in a suit for that purpose, to
which all who participated in the proceeds are made party : Id.
A person asking for the rescission of a contract, &c., must, as a pre-
requisite to his suit, return or tender what he has received from tle
transaction complained of, and otherwise restore, so far as possible to
him, the condition of things as they stood before the contract, &o., that
he attacks: Id.
SHIPPING.
United States Commissioners' Fees-Reshlpment of Sailors.-The pro-
vision of sect. 4513, Revised Statutes, that the fee of $2 required to be
paid to the shipping commissioner for each seaman shipped, under sects.
4511 and 4512, shall not be exacted, where, on the return of the vessel,
the sailor reships in the same vessel for another voyage, applies to reship-
ments for all voyages succeeding the first in regular order, and is not
limited to the reshipment for the one voyage immediately following the
one at which the fees were paid : Young v. American Steamship Co.,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
STATUTE. See Exemption.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law
TELEGRAPH. See Constitutional Law.
TRIAL.
Time of Introduction of Evidence.-A court may, in its discretion,
allow the introduction of evidence after the arguments of counsel have
been concluded: Darland v. Rosencrans, 56 Iowa.
TROVER.
Conditional Sale-Right of endor.-If a chattel is sold and de-
livered upon condition that it shall be paid for on a certain day, and
shall remain the property of the seller until paid for, the seller has not
such possession or right to immediate possession as will support an
action of tort in the nature of trover, against an officer who has attached
the chattel as the property of the purchaser, brought before the day
named for payment: lNewhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass.
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co-partner by signing an instrument under seal in the firm name and
style, simply by virtue of his authority as partner. To make such
instrument binding on the partner not signing in person, it must appear
that he previously authorized the act or subsequently ratified it, either
expressly or impliedly. And such previous authority or subsequent
confirmation may be shown by parol or by circumstances: Berzog v.
Sawyer, 61 Md.
PLEADING.
Slander-nconsistent Defences.-In an action for slander the defend-
ant may set up the defences : First, that he did not use the language
imputed to him; and second, that such language is true. The two
defences are not inconsistent with each other and both may be true:
Cole v. Woodson, 32 Kans.
POWER. See Husband and Wife.
PRACTICE.
Township failing to Elect Officer-Service by Publication in Suit
against.-Although a township in the state fails, neglects and refuses to
elect or permit or allow its trustee, clerk or tieasurer to qualify or to
designate some person upon whom service of summons or other legal
process directed against it can be made, it cannot be brought into court
upon service by publication, as it does not thereby, within the terms of
the statute, conceal itself: Rockway v. Oswego Township, 32 Kans.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier; Negligence.
SALE.
Rescission of-Insolvency of the Buyer-Assignment for benefit of
Creditors-Delivery and Acceptance.-The insolvency of the buyer
does not in itself revoke an agreement for the purchase of goods made
prior to the insolvency. If the property in such case is delivered, the
title vests in the assignee. The seller may stop the goods in transitu,
but if he does not, the title passes on delivery: McElroy v. Seery, 61
Md.
The same principle applies to the case of a voluntary assignment for
the benefit of creditors : Id.
TAXATION.
Municipal Improvement- Ordinance- Opening Street-Public Benefit
-Presumption.-If an ordinance providing for the opening or improv-
ing a street, declares in terms that the improvement is for the general
public benefit or convenience, without anything more, itwill be presumed
that the ordinance was enacted with an exclusive reference to the gen-
eral public convenience, and with no reference whatever to local benefits
to owners of adjoining property ; and therefore the cost of the improve-
ment should be borne exclusively from the public treasury. But if the
ordinance be silent upon the subject of the interests or benefits to be
subserved, the presumption will be made that it contemplated local bene-
fits as well as the general public convenience : Mayor, &c., v. Hanson,
61 Md.
TELEGRAPH. See Constitutional Law.
